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CURRENT LEGISLATION
THE CLOSE CORPORATION AND SECTION NINE OF THE NEW
YORK STOCK CORPORATION LAw.-There have been few questions

in the law on which textwriters and courts have differed more completely than on the subject of the close corporation.' It has been
termed a "chartered" 2 or "incorporated" 3 partnership, a corporation
having five stockholders or less,4 and as ".

.

. an enterprise in cor-

porate form in which management and ownership are substantially
identical." 5 The true concept of the close corporation is found in
the nature of its attributes and the purposes of its formation rather
than in any attempt at definition. It is usually composed of a few
stockholders who have chosen the corporate form of doing business
to avoid some of the disadvantages of the partnership, usually the
unlimited liability peculiar to that entity. The members seek to
establish an organization that is a corporation to the world but a
partnership among the stockholders themselves. The individuals involved usually embody all the corporation's needs as to management,
trade skill, capital, etc., and hold their stock only as evidence of their
share of ownership. Dividends to the stockholder in the close corporation are not his main interest, in fact, they are seldom, if ever,
declared. He looks to his salary as his return on his investment, and
'One writer comments, upon the attitude of the courts toward the close
corporation as a ". . . blindness which has made the advocates of each unaware of the fact that there are corporations and corporations, and that the
problems, needs and dangers involved in one may not be present in the other."
Weiner, Legislative Recognition of the Close Corporation, 27 Mica. L. Rav.
273 (1929).
2 Ripin v. U. S. Woven Label Co., 205 N. Y, 442, 447, 98 N. E. 855, 856
(1912), wherein the court in speaking of the close corporation said: "By the
Business Corporations Law three or more persons might form a corporation
for any lawful business with certain specified exceptions, . . . many businesses
or private enterprises which formerly had been conducted by partnerships or
individuals, became the subject of corporate control and ownership. Such corporations were little more (though not quite the same as) than chartered
partnerships."
3 Cuppy v. Ward, 187 App. Div. 625, 639, 176 N. Y. Supp. 233, 243 (1st
Dep't 1919), aff'd them., 227 N. Y. 603, 125 N. E. 915 (1919). Here the court
said: ". . . although we are dealing with a corporate entity, its entire capital
stock is owned by two individuals, in nearly equal proportions, who acquired
and who hold the stock by virtue of a mutual agreement . . . in such manner
as to constitute what has frequently been called in this court an 'incorporated
partnership.'"
4 Winer, Proposing a New York "Close Corporation Law," 28 CORN. L. Q.

313, 335, 336 (1943).

5 Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CoRN. L. Q. 488 (1948).
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wishes to protect this investment by exercising control over the management and policies of the corporation. Stock certificates to him,
therefore, are no more than the indicia of voting power. With his
stock, he seeks to accomplish two purposes, i.e., to insure himself of
corporation, and to control the policies and manemployment by the
6
agement thereof.
In a partnership, partners are free to agree among themselves
in whom control will be vested; 7 and in the close corporation stockholders strive to attain this type of freedom in their organization.
When incorporated, however, they must conform to the multitude of
statutory regulations applicable to this creature of the state, and control and management must be vested in a board of directors,8 who in
turn must act in behalf of the entity as such. Ordinarily, any agreement, either among stockholders or directors, which limits the discretion of the directors by creating a sterilized board, is void and
unenforceable as against public policy. 9
To attain this control, so necessary for the protection of his investment and employment, the stockholder in the close corporation
has resorted to several devices designed to circumvent the statutory
requirement of board action. By assuming a simple example of the
close corporation setup, we may more readily appreciate some of the
obstacles which bring about the use of these devices. Take a corporation composed of three members, each holding thirty-three and
one-third per centum of the shares outstanding, each a director, and
each employed by the entity. In the ordinary case, excluding any
separate agreements or by-law provisions, it would always be pos6 For a more comprehensive discussion of the close corporation and its
peculiar problems, see 1948 LEG. Doc. No. 65(K), 1948 REPORT, LAW REvisiON CommissioN; Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CoRN.

L. Q. 488 (1948); Winer, Proposing a New York "Close Corporation Law"
28

CORN.

L. Q. 313 (1943); Weiner, Legislative Recognition of the Close

Corporation,27 MIcH. L. REv. 273 (1929).
7 See N. Y. PARMERSmP LAW § 40.
8

See N. Y. GEN. Coas. LAW §§ 27, 28.
In Manson v. Curtis, 223 N. Y. 313, 323, 119 N. E. 559, 562 (1918),
plaintiff and defendant, both stockholders and directors of the corporation, held
between them the majority of the stock of the corporation. They agreed that
the plaintiff would be vested with the sole and exclusive management and
executive administration of the corporation and that the president, to be elected,
would be only a nominal figurehead who would not interfere with plaintiff's
management of the business. They further agreed to unite in the choice and
election of six of the corporation's seven directors; and, it was their apparent
intent, from reading the agreement as a whole, that the board of directors
was to remain passive in the affairs of the corporation. The court held this
9

agreement illegal and void on the ground that directors

". .

. hold such office

charged with the duty to act for the corporation according to their best judgment, and in so doing they cannot be controlled in the reasonable exercise and
performance of such duty.

. .

.

stockholders cannot . . . control the direc-

tors in the exercise of the judgment vested in them by virtue of their office.
. . . Clearly the law does not permit the stockholders to create a sterilized
board of directors."
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sible for two of the members to effect the discharge of the third by
acting through a majority vote of the board of directors as required
by statute. One stockholder could, by the same token, be deprived
of any control in policy or management; and the loss of this veto
power would impair the value of his stock to that extent.
It is quite natural, therefore, for stockholders in close corporations to seek methods of preventing such action, thereby insuring
their employment and salary. Several methods have been attempted
to attain this goal of protection in spite of the maze of statutory regulations which were enacted primarily to protect the investor in the
public-issue corporation. A requirement for a unanimous vote, either
by separate agreement among the stockholders or among the directors, or in the by-laws would seem to be practical solutions. As was
seen above, 10 the two former methods are ordinarily void and unenforceable and the main objection to the by-law requirement is that
it gives rise to an anomalous situation wherein a corporation might
be rendered unworkable.'
While this is undoubtedly true, it must
be remembered that to look upon a close corporation in its proper
light, it is a corporation de jure but a partnership de facto. The
basis of the rule invalidating separate agreements when applied to the
close corporation becomes untenable and impractical, for in such an
entity we expect the stockholders and directors to be the same individuals. It is true that the rule is based upon the fact that directors owe their primary duty to the corporation; but, where the
directors and the corporation are practically identical, it is manifest
that it should not apply.
A review of the several leading New York decisions dealing
with these agreements prior to the enactment of Section 9 of the New
York Stock Corporation Law will best serve to show the success
with which they were met by the courts. In the first of these cases,
McQuade v. Stoneham,'2 defendant, a majority stockholder, sold
shares of stock to the plaintiff and another and at the same time
entered into an agreement with them that they would all use their
best efforts to continue themselves as directors and officers at specified
salaries as long as they continued to own the shares of stock held by
them at the time of the agreement. The court, in holding the agreement invalid, said: "Directors may not by agreements entered into
as stockholders abrogate their independent judgment."' 3 Later, in
Clark v. Dodge,14 the court upheld an agreement entered into by all
the corporation's stockholders, wherein the defendant agreed to vote
his stock as a director to keep the plaintiff in control of the corpora10 See note 9 supra.

"See Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N. Y. 112, 119, 60 N. E. 2d 829,
831 (1945), discussed in text infra.
12263 N. Y. 323, 189 N. E. 234 (1934).
13Id. at 328, 189 N. E. at 236.
14269 N. Y. 410, 199 N. E. 641 (1936).

1949 ]

CURRENT LEGISLATION

tion and to insure his receiving one-fourth of the net income of the
corporation by way of salary or dividends. The court there stated:
"If the enforcement of a particular contract damages nobody-not
even, in any perceptible degree, the public-one sees no reason for
holding it invalid, even though it impinges slightly on the broad provision of section 27." 1 The court there distinguished both McQuade
v. Stoneham and Manson v. Curtis,' recalling that in those cases all
of the stockholders were not parties to the agreement. In view of
these decisions it would appear that the deciding factor in determining the validity of these agreements would be whether or not all
stockholders were parties to them; 17 but the recent decision in Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel 18 might lead to a different conclusion. In
that case plaintiff and defendant owned one-third and two-thirds respectively of the stock of a small corporation. They entered into an
agreement not to vote their shares against each other and if they
failed to agree, not to vote at all. They also amended the corporate
by-laws by embodying four by-laws requiring:
1. Unanimity for all shareholders' resolutions.
2.

Unanimity for all elections of directors.

3.

Unanimity for all directors' resolutions.

4. Unanimity for all amendments of by-laws by the shareholders.
Subsequently they disagreed and an action was begun in equity
to have the by-laws declared valid and to enjoin the defendant from
taking any action inconsistent therewith. The Court of Appeals held
invalid by-laws (1), (2) and (3) and upheld the validity of by-law
(4), saying that the first three were "....

almost as a matter of law

unworkable and unenforceable." 19 With respect to by-law (1) the
court stated that even in the absence of authority on the question
the requirement of unanimity for all stockholders' resolutions is
....

obnoxious to the statutory scheme of stock corporation manage-

15 Id. at 415, 199 N. E. at 642.
16 For a discussion of the facts and decision in this case, see note 9 supra.
17 But cf. Matter of Buckley, 183 Misc. 189, 193, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 54, 57, 58
(Sup. Ct. 1944), wherein the court stated: "Had the court intended to base
its decision solely upon the fact that all the stockholders were parties to the
agreement it could easily have done so without expressing the opinion that
agreements which deviated slightly from section 27 were nevertheless legM
if they harmed no one. That the Court of Appeals did not intend to predicate
its holding solely upon the fact that all the stockholders were parties to the
agreement is confirmed by the fact that the court disapproved of the 'broad
dicta in the McQuade opinion' (p. 417) and declared that 'the broad statements
-in the McQuade opinion, applicable to the facts there, should be confined to
those facts' (p. 417)."
18294 N. Y. 112, 60 N. E. 2d 829 (1945).
'OId. at 119, 60 N. E. 2d at 831.
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ment." 20 The court asserted that the result of enforcing such a
by-law, would be the deprivation of a representative form of government in that a minority interest would have an ". . . absolute, permanent, all inclusive power of veto." 21 The court also expressed
the fear that a minority stockholder could prevent dissolution until
such time as he should decide to vote for it. It would seem that this
threat is not as dire as imagined in that a court of equity would in
a proper case grant relief. By-law (3) was held to be opposed to
the common law, and utterly inconsistent with sections 27 and 28 of
the New York General Corporation Law and their legislative history.
As to by-law (4) the court felt that while such a by-law is neither
authorized nor forbidden, it involved no public policy or interest for
it was not an attempt to escape the ". . . regulatory framework set
up by law" nor "... such as will turn the corporation into some other
kind of entity." 22 It is manifest that this decision made it impossible
for close corporations to make any effective by-law provisions by
which minority stockholders would attain the protection so avidly
sought, at least solong as the then-existing statutory pattern remained
in force.
The legislature, prompted by the decision in the Benintendi case,
and by the recommendations of the New York Law Revision Commission,23 enacted Section 9 of the New York Stock Corporation
Law,2 4 and thereby have given legal sanction to the close corporation.
Section 9 reads as follows:
§ 9. Provisions of certificates of incorporation; requirement of
greater than majority or plurality vote of directors and shareholders; restrictions
1. The certificate of incorporation as originally filed, or as
amended by certificate filed pursuant to section thirty-five of the
stock corporation law, may contain provisions specifying any
or all of the following:
(a) that the number of directors who shall be present
at any meeting of the directors in order to constitute a
quorum for the transaction of any business or of any specified item of business shall be such number greater than a
majority as may be specified in such certificate;
(b) that the number of votes of directors that shall be
necessary for the transaction of any business or of any specified item of business at any meeting of directors shall be
20
21
22

Id. at 118, 60 N. E. 2d at 831.
Ibid.
Id. at 121, 60 N. E. 2d at 832.

See Note, Limitations of Corporate

By-Laws, 19 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 144 (1945).
23 1948 LEG. Doc. No. 65(K), 1948 REPoRT, LAw RmisioN ComissiDr.
24

Laws of N. Y. 1948, c. 862, § 1, as amended, Laws of N. Y. 1949, c. 261.
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such number greater than a majority as may be specified in
such certificate;
(c) that the number of shares of any class having
voting power, the holders of which shall be present in person or represented by proxy at any meeting in order to constitute a quorum for the transaction of any business or any
specified item of business at a meeting of the stockholders
shall be a number greater than the majority or plurality
prescribed by law in the absence of such provision;
(d) that the number of votes or consents of the holders
of shares of any class of stock having voting power that
shall be necessary for the transaction of any business or of
any specified item of business at a meeting of the stockholders, including amendments to the certificate of incorporation, or the giving of any consent, shall be a number
greater than the majority or plurality prescribed by law in
the absence of such provision.
2. (a) A requirement for a quorum, vote or consent of
directors or shareholders, which is invalid except for the
authorization therefor granted by this section, shall not be
valid hereunder unless (i) it appears in the certificate of
incorporation as originally filed or as amended by certificate
filed pursuant to law; (ii) notice of its existence appears
plainly on the face or back of all stock certificates; and (iii)
it specifies a period no longer than ten years for its duration.
(b) An amendatory certificate filed pursuant to law
containing a requirement authorized by this section shall be
subscribed and acknowledged by every subscriber of the certificate of incorporation and every subscriber to stock if no
stock has been issued, or in person or by proxy by the
holders of record of all the outstanding shares of the corporation. Such certificate may be amended at any time in
the same manner.

3. The requirements specified pursuant to subdivision one
of this section, may at any time be renewed or extended from
time to time for further periods, not exceeding ten years each
upon compliance with the provisions of this section.
4. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to limit the
power of a court of equity to decree a dissolution in a proper
case.
The foregoing section seeks to afford to a close corporation the
unanimity concept of control that has always been inherent in a part-
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nership and sought by the close corporation. It is apparent, therefore, that by complying with the conditions provided for in the section, the stockholders in the close corporation can effectively achieve
that measure of control and veto power necessary to protect their
interests.
It should be noted, however, that this section is only permissive,
and in order to take advantage of the changes effected by it, the corporation must comply strictly with the conditions precedent found in
subdivisions (2) and (3). Subdivision 2 (a) (i), requiring the provisions for unanimity or qualified majority to appear in the certificate
of incorporation itself rather than in any by-law or extrinsic agreement, assures the existence of a public record of the requirement and
of its terms and conditions. The original certificate or any amended
certificate of incorporation containing the requirement will be on file
in the office of the Secretary of State as required by law,2 5 and will,
therefore, be available to the public for inspection at any time.
Subdivision 2 (a) (ii), requiring that notice of the existence of
the provision appear plainly on all of the stock certificates gives
26
ample notice to those who may subsequently become stockholders.
Since the highest degree of united action is required to continue
under this statute, it would appear that where a minority stockholder
becomes enmeshed in, or envisions, unharmonious relations because
of a change in his relationship with the other stockholders or for any
other reason, a path back to majority rule has been provided by subdivision 2 (a) (iii) which limits the period of duration of any provision adopted under this section to ten years. A shareholder might
well determine to compromise during the remaining limited term
rather than effect a dissolution.2 7 There will be no problems of dissenting minority stockholders, because subdivision 2 (b) requires- the
unanimous consent of all stockholders and/or subscribers to the certificate or stock, if no stock has been issued, before any provision
permitted by the section may be adopted. It should also be noted
that after the expiration of ten years Section 9 will have no effect
and activities of shareholders and directors will be without its scope
§ 8(2).
See Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORN. L. Q. 488,
506 (1948), for a sample form of compliance with Section 9 on a stock transfer
certificate.
27 A provision for dissolution in case of a deadlock was not included in the
new section because the Law Revision Commission felt that "While it would
be possible for a corporation under the proposed statute to require a vote
greater than a majority to control voluntary dissolution, in the opinion of the
commission, the powers of a court of equity are sufficient to compel directors,
at the suit of a stockholder, to institute proceedings under Article 9 of the
General Corporation Law in a proper case where a deadlock was causing injury
to the corporation. (Kroger v. Jaburg, 231 App. Div. 641 (1931); Gottfried
v. Gottfried, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 951 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co. 1944).)" 1948 LEG. Doc.
No. 65(K), 1948 REPORT, LAW REmVSION CoMMissioN, pp. 7, 8.
25 N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW
26
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unless there is a renewal for an additional period not exceeding ten
years, as provided for by subdivision 3 upon recompliance with the
foregoing conditions.
Section 9 in no way affects the already existing provisions of the
Stock Corporation Law or the General Corporation Law, since as has
already been pointed out, it is permissive legislation, limited in its
application to those corporations which have complied with the procedure outlined in the section.
Generally, provisions of shareholders' agreements which forbid
directors of a corporation from changing officers, salaries or policies,
or to continue each other as directors, would still be invalid because
directors may not by agreements entered into as stockholders abrogate their independent judgment; and, any contract impairing the
discretion of a director will be void as against public policy.28 Nor
will Section 9 protect any individual guilty of fraud or acts of bad
faith, for relief in such cases would be granted in a court of equity. 29
Agreements to continue directors in office may still be valid, notwithstanding the Benintendi decision and without complying with the
conditions of Section 9, where all the stockholders are parties to the
agreement, under the doctrine of Clark v. Dodge.3 0 So also, a provision in the certificate of incorporation providing that the number
of directors can not be changed except by the unanimous consent of
all the shareholders would still be valid without complying with
the
31
section, under the decision in Ripin v. U. S. Woven Label Co.
As has been seen above, compliance with Section 9 will permit
the adoption of any or all of the four enumerated provisions. The
provisions permitted by subdivisions 1 (a) (directors' quorum) and
1 (b) (directors' votes) are almost inextricably linked together.
Assuming that the number of directors' votes necessary to transact
business has been established, it would then become pointless to set
the number necessary for a quorum of directors at a smaller figure.
Therefore, the figure established for a quorum should be at least as
great, or greater than, the number of directors' votes required to
transact business, though in no event may it be less than one-third
of the board. The converse of this, however, is not true, and the
number of votes necessary for directors' acts may be less than the
quorum figure, provided it is a majority of the quorum. Similarly,
the same inter-relation exists between the third and fourth provisions
28 See Manson v. Curtis, supra note 9.
29
N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 9(4).
30 See note 14 supra.

31205 N. Y. 442, 98 N. E. 855 (1912). However, to overcome the rule in
Matter of Boulevard Theatre & Realty Co., 195 App. Div. 518, 186 N. Y.
Supp. 430 (1st Dep't 1921), aff'd nwnm., 231 N. Y. 615, 132 N. E. 910 (1921),
that a provision in a certificate of incorporation requiring a director to be
elected by a unanimous vote of all the stockholders is invalid, compliance with
Section 9 must be had.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 23

relating to stockholders' quorums and stockholders' votes. A requirement of a greater than majority of directors for a quorum standing
alone is undesirable. Where a certificate requires both unanimity for
a directors' quorum and the unanimous vote of all directors present
at a meeting for the transaction of any business, an absolute veto
power is granted to each director in that his mere absence from the
meeting will preclude the transaction of such business. The obvious
result of this situation will make improbable any discussion or compromise that might have ensued had the absent director been present.
Such result is in opposition to the beneficial theory behind the requirement that directors act as a board. Especially undesirable would
be the quorum provisions standing alone when it-related to a specified
item of business only. In such case the exercise of that particular
veto power would necessarily exclude the director from sitting in or
voting upon any other business to be transacted at a meeting. The
solution is in the use of both provisions.
Whatever elasticity this freedom of selection possesses, pales by
comparison with the flexibility provided in the truly broad wording
of each of the four permissible amendments. By its language the
section permits the setting of these greater than majority or plurality
requirements for all acts of the directors or stockholders or for one
or more enumerated acts.
In other words not only may the corporation select any or all
of the four provisions and adopt them, but even within any one provision it may restrict the directors or stockholders in their employment of these voting orquorum requirements to one or more specified
situations. This becomes important when one appreciates that the
true significance of Section 9 lies not in a newly created affirmative
power of directors or stockholders to force action but rather in that
Section 9 affords a veto power. Consider the typical situation wherein a director or stockholder who while fully desirous of permitting
the corporation to be conducted in its every day affairs by those who
are more qualified than himself, at the same time wishes to insure
for himself permanent employment. If the requirements for directors'
quorums or acts are set at such a level for all business so that the
mere absence of the director will prevent the transaction of any business, the corporation is unduly hampered in its every-day affairs, and
for no good reason, since the director or stockholder wishing to
perpetuate his employment could have done so easily by specifying
initially that the unanimity or qualified majority requirements be
applied only when problems relating to dismissal of employees were
before the board. From the foregoing then it is obvious that the
wide variety of control provided by Section 9 as to directors' acts
should be employed only to the degree necessary to effect the purpose
of those implementing it. As to ordinary matters of the corporation
there is wisdom in a rule by majority and even in the law of partner-
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3 2ships such is the rule unless expressly changed by the partners.
At common law only a majority of a board of directors was
necessary to constitute a quorum and a majority of that quorum was
empowered to transact business. 3 3 Section 27 of the New York General Corporation Law embodies the common law, but it does allow a
change for it permits the by-laws to fix the number of directors necessary to constitute a quorum at a number less than a majority of
the board, but not less than one-third of its number. Section 9 in
no way affects this statute wherein it prescribes minimum limits but
Section 9 does permit the exceeding of the requirement that the
majority of the directors present may transact business, up to and
including a requirement of unanimity.
With the passage of Section 9 any possible argument that these
greater than majority requirements may not be set even without the
aid of this section do not become superfluous, because to implement
Section 9 the unanimous consent of the stockholders is necessary, and
,a situation wherein this might be impossible can easily be
visualized. In this light it cannot be said by the reading of Section
27 that it is capable of one construction only. That the by-laws
cannot fix the number of directors necessary to constitute a quorum
at a figure less than one-third of its number is quite clear, but may
they at a figure greater than a majority of its number? Is a provision
to that effect in the certificate of incorporation or in an agreement
between all stockholders valid? It is interesting to note, in this connection, that the words in Section 27 "unless otherwise provided"
were followed in laws of 1892, c. 687 (a predecessor to Section 27)
by the words "by law" and under such provision a quorum of directors must be a majority of all the directors unless otherwise provided
in charter or special law, and by-laws could not change this rule, the
word "law" being construed as having reference to an act of the
legislature of equal dignity, force and character as the provision in
question.3 4 The words "by law" were deleted in 1904.35 It is not
unreasonable to argue that by such deletion the legislature had manifested an intent that the statutory pattern could be varied by the acts
of the parties concerned, at least insofar as a provision regarding a
quorum of directors is concerned.3 6 But the Court of Appeals in

§ 40(8).
7 Cow. 402, 17 Am. Dec. 525 (N. Y. 1827);
Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N. Y. 112, 119, 60 N. E. 2d 829, 831 (1945).
32N.

Y.

PARTmasrmp LAW

33 Ex parte Willcocks,

34 Ops. Ar'y Gmz;. 253 (1900).
35 Laws of N. Y. 1904, c. 737, § 29.
36 This was obviously the construction given to it in Benintendi v. Kenton
Hotel, 181 Misc. 897, 900, 45 N. Y. S. 2d 705, 708 (Sup. Ct. 1943), where in
determining whether a by-law requiring the unanimous vote of directors for
any resolution of the directors, was inconsistent with law, the court said: "It
is not altogether clear whether the 'Unless otherwise provided' clause of section
27 qualifies only the provision that a majority shall be necessary to constitute
a quorum or whether it also qualifies the provision that the act of a majority
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Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel 37 in referring to Section 27, said:
Section 27 modifies the common law rules only to the extent of permitting
a corporation to enact by-laws fixing "the number of directors necessary to
constitute a quorum at a number less than a majority of the board, but not
less than one-third of its number." Every corporation is thus given the privilege of enacting a by-law fixing its own quorum requirement at any fraction
not less than one-third nor niwre than a majority of its directors. But the
very idea of a "quorum" is that, when that required number of persons goes
into session as a body, the votes of a majority thereof are sufficient for binding
action. . . . Thus, while by-law No. 3 (that requiring unanimity for all directors' resolutions) is not in explicit terms forbidden by section 27 . . . it
seems to flout the plain purpose of the legislature in passing that statute. We
have not overlooked section 28 of the General Corporation Law, the first
sentence of which is as follows: "Wherever, under the provisions of any corporate law a corporation is authorized to take any action by its directors,
action may be taken by the directors, regularly convened as a board, and acting
by a majority of a quorum, except when otherwise expressly required by law
or the by-laws and any such action shall be executed in behalf of the corporation by such officers as shall be designated by the board." Reading together
sections 27 and 28 and examining their legislative history . . . , we conclude
that there never was a legislative intent so to change the common law rule as
to quorums as to authorize a by-law like the one under scrutiny ... A by-law
requiring for every action of the board not only a unanimous vote of a quorum
of the directors, but of all the directors, sets up a scheme of management
utterly inconsistent with sections 27 and 28."

It is apparent that the court felt that, in view of the express language in Section 28, the court must first determine that a provision
for a greater than majority of directors to constitute a quorum would
be invalid (though such a provision was not directly involved in the
case). It would then follow that the provision requiring unanimity
for directors' acts would be clearly invalid since to allow it would, in
effect, be allowing the first provision. This line of reasoning would
not invalidate a by-law requiring for every action of the board a
unanimous vote of a quorum of directors.38
Wohl v. Avon Electrical Supplies is the only New York case

found in which the validity of a provision requiring a greater than
majority for a quorum was directly involved.3 9 The provision was
shall be the act of the board. The only case the court has found on the subject is a Special Term decision upholding a by-law requiring a unanimous vote
of directors for a sale of corporate assets in bulk, as being 'otherwise provided'
under section 27. (Levin v. Mayer, 86 Misc. 116.)"
The court thought it
unnecessary to decide in view of N. Y. GEN. Coaz. LAw § 28. It is to be noted
that for election of directors N. Y. STocK Coae. LAW § 55 expressly provides
that a requirement for a quorum shall not exceed a majority.
37 294 N. Y. 112, 119, 60 N. E. 2d 829, 831 (1945).
38 But see Goldfarb v. Dorset Products, - Misc. -, 82 N. Y. S. 2d 42, 44
(Sup. Ct. 1948), where the court in citing the Bemintendi case said, "No valid
provision may be made in a stockholder's agreement or otherwise requiring
the concurrence of more than a majority of a quorum of the board of directors."
39 55 N. Y. S. 2d 253 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
The provision involved was a re-

1949 ]

CURRENT LEGISLATION

upheld, in reliance upon the reasoning of the lower court in the Benintendi case, on the ground that it was not inconsistent with law and
not against public policy since Section 101 of the New York General
Corporation Law would allow a petition for dissolution to be made
by a majority of directors, in case of deadlock. The Wohl case was
decided on April 2, 1945, and the authority and reasoning upon which
it relied was reversed by the Court of Appeals in the Benintendi case,
three days later, on April 5, 1945.
The foregoing has been written with a view toward determining
whether a provision of greater than majority referable to a quorum
of directors is valid without the aid of Section 9 of the New York
Stock Corporation Law. The Benintendi case said it is invalid, although the court was not primarily concerned with that provision.
Is that holding dicta? Was it necessary in order to reach the conclusion, which the court did, concerning a provision of unanimity for
directors' acts? In the court's view of the case, it was. But, whether
or not it was, there is little doubt that such a provision, couched in
all-inclusive terms, would be invalid. The philosophy of the Benintendi case is that the price of exercising corporate privilege is conformity to the statutory scheme. Section 27 would be construed as
declaratory of the common law permitting no change other than that
expressly provided before. Influential in such construction might be
the law's abhorrence of a deadlock (the Benintendi case view), the
interrelation of Sections 27 and 28 of General Corporation Law 40
and the passage of Section 9 of Stock Corporation Law. Although
Section 9 is intended to provide a means for control which would
otherwise be invalid and not intended to invalidate that which would
otherwise be valid, the latter result might very well follow. Until
the Benintendi case is further construed the law is somewhat uncertain. 41 Not unlikely will be the courts' temptation to rationalize,
when called upon to construe the law, that the legislature in enacting
Section 9 provided a means for variance from the statutory majority
quirement that five members of the board would constitute a quorum. It was
a six-man board.
40 See PRAsHxER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 972
(1937) :

"The rule requiring group determination is subject to exceptions.

The courts have sustained directors' acts though they were not the result of
board meetings where (1) the directors owned all the stock in a close corporation, or (2) the shareholders waived the holding of a meeting of the board
ot directors, (3) the custom or usage of the directors was to act separately
and not as a board." A requirement of unanimity for a quorum not only increases the number of directors necessary to act but also gives each individual
director an effective veto power.
41 The Benintendi case threw doubt on Clark v. Dodge, 269 N. Y. 410, 199
N. E. 641 (1936), which had caused belief that agreements between participants of a close corporation, provided all shareholders were parties to them,
would probably be sustained when no public or creditor interest would be
prejudiced, despite the fact that if strictly construed they might violate the
statutory scheme.
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or plurality, as the case may be, if, and only if the conditions precedent to the operation of the statute be complied with, i.e., 1. appearance of provision in certificate of incorporation, 2. and in stock
certificates, 3. duration of not more than ten years and, 4. consent
of all participants; and that participants who fail to take advantage
of the means available
to them should not be allowed to alter the
42
statutory pattern.
43
Most corporation laws, and New York's are no exception,
usually provide that the every-day affairs of a corporation shall be
conducted by the board of directors. However, while some voice is
given to stockholders in the conduct of the corporation, it is usually
confined to what by comparison with every-day affairs might be called
extraordinary matters. These are of two types; those which in the
last analysis only the stockholders may act upon, such as selling or
mortgaging the property or franchises, consolidation or voluntary
dissolution; or those which while the directors have the power to act
upon alone, they usually prefer to obtain stockholder approval. An
example of this would be an executive pension plan which while the
directors can legally establish it, is so inherently full of trouble in the
nature of stockholders' suits that the stockholders' approval is extremely desirable. 44 The actions upon which the stockholders' approvals are mandatory are found in the Stock Corporation laws. 45
They, by individual specification, require either majority, qualified
majority or plurality vote. Some require unanimity.
Section 9 changes this and now permits any qualification greater
than the majority or plurality heretofore necessary 416 up to and in42 See Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CoRer. L. Q. 488,
504 (1948), to the effect that courts will probably tend toward strict construction of agreements entered into after September 1, 1948, and thus toward
a holding that even an agreement to employ "X" for life and during good
behavior depends on Section 9 for its validity and thus should be struck down
unless arrived at by indirection under Section 9. Israels is also of the opinion
that agreements forbidding removal of directors or change of number by
statutory majority are probably invalid under the new statute because they
appear elsewhere than in the certificate of incorporation.
43 N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 27.
44 N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §§ 16, 19, 20, 36, 86, 105 and others.
45 The thought apparently is that if stockholder approval is sought and
obtained in possible later stockholder actions the directors' good faith is established and in addition there may be present the element of estoppel.
46 Section 9 will not be permitted to decrease existing statutory requirements so that its effect on a statute such as Secion 16 of the Stock Corporation Law which requires the approval of two-thirds of the stockholders in
order for the directors to validly mortgage the property of the corporation
will be to permit the increase of the approval from two-thirds up to and including unanimity. Section 51 of the Stock Corporation Law which permits
under certain conditions limitations upon the right to vote insists under other
conditions that the right to vote on specified items of business as enumerated
shall not be prevented unless these conditions are met.
That Section 9 is to have no effect upon Section 51 was expressly declared
in Laws of N. Y. 1948, c. 862, § 2, effective September 1, 1948.
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cluding unanimity. It does not enlarge the area within which stockholders may act, for the words "any business" while general in scope
doubtlessly mean business upon which they must vote or upon which
they may vote. In short they will not be permitted to specify items
of business as coming within the purview of their authority unless
authorized by statute for by so doing they might very well be removing the affairs of the corporation from their mandatory management
by the board of directors. Probably, however, they may apply the
increased majority or plurality permission of Section 9 to "any
business" or "any specified item of business" which though not required to be, happens to be presented to them by the directors. If
this protection is not adequate for the stockholders' purposes, they
then must resort to the method of first securing representation on the
board of directors if they do not already possess it, and then by implementing Section 9, establish for this representative or representatives a veto power.
This method is to be preferred for two reasons. First it prevents
the possibility that the protective devices of the stockholders will be
found to be invalid in that they are sterilizing the board of directors.
Secondly if the stock is not extremely closely held the problem of
stalemate, inherent in all these means, is greatly magnified, since experience has shown that stockholders are even more prone than directors to disagree. If the stock is so held that the directors and
the shareholders are the same, and they hold the stock in equal
proportions, the danger of disagreement is not as acute, but the possibility of invalidity still makes it desirable to restrict at the board,
rather than stockholder level. For the stockholder who is not a
director and who is unable to secure representation on the board,
there is, of course, left to him only the method of establishing the
quorum and voting requirements at such a level so that his absence
or negative vote exercises a veto power. Realistically however, it is
probably true that any stockholder who cannot secure board representation will also be unable to establish those requirements at the
necessary level, if indeed he can do so at all.
Whether Section 9 should be used, and, if so, to what extent,
depends, in the final analysis, upon the objectives of the participants
of the corporation. Should the objectives be attainable apart from
Section 9, then the section ought to be disregarded because of its
technical requirements and because its protection can be no longer
than of ten years' duration. It follows that in the consideration of
how best to provide for the protection desired, thought must be given
to the nature of and the law concerning shareholders' agreements,
employment contracts, voting trusts, cumulative voting, restrictions
on transfer and cross option agreements on stock, classification of
shares and any other protective measures available apart from or
within Section 9. A few examples will serve to illustrate what has
been said.
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If the participants desire that none but the original participants
shall ever be members of the corporation, without the consent of all
concerned, Section 9 does not aid them. But their desire, may be
affected by an agreement giving each other, or to the corporation, or
both, an option to purchase the shares of the participant who is desirous of selling before the same are offered to outsiders. 47 An agreement between the owners of all the stock of a corporation that in the
event of death of any one of them, one of the survivors should have
an option to buy the stock held by the deceased shareholder at a
certain price within a certain time, although designed to perpetuate
control of the corporation in the hands of the parties to the agreement
and their 48survivors, is not illegal as restricting the right to alienate
property.
If a minority stockholder seeks representation on the board of
directors so as to influence ordinary matters, cumulative voting would
be effective provided that his proportionate holdings are at least equal
to the proportion that "one" bears to the total number of directors.
This method, however, is subject to the powers of the majority to
change the number of directors or issue new shares. But as to the
change of number of directors, a requirement of unanimous shareholders' consent is valid. 49 As to the issuance of new shares, unless
preemptive rights afford protection there may be none. In such case,
a requirement of unanimity of directors for a quorum or for any act
is not helpful but a requirement also valid by Section 9 of unanimous
consent of shareholders for amending the certificate of incorporation
as to issuance of new shares is foolproof for ten years. The issuing
of classes of shares in which each class would be entitled to elect a
specified proportionate number of directors is effective if the votes
or consents of the holders of a majority of each class of shares are
required for amending the certificates of incorporation so that the
shares could not be reclassified or new shares issued, or number of
directors changed without such consent.50 Possibly a voting trust
agreement might require the trustees to vote for named individuals
and be enforceable. 51 Such agreements are subject to a ten-year
limitation.
If a minority stockholder desires to be a director he may secure
such position by an agreement with all other stockholders to elect
47 Bloomingdale v. Bloomingdale, 107 Misc. 646, 177 N. Y. Supp. 872 (Sup.
The shares must be appropriately
stamped as required by N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 176. See also Brown v.
Button, 41 App. Div. 57, 58 N. Y. Supp. 353 (4th Dep't 1899).
48 Scruggs v. Catterhill, 67 App. Div. 583, 73 N. Y. Supp. 882 (1st Dep't
1902).
49
Ripin v. U. S. Woven Label Co., 205 N. Y. 442, 98 N. E. 855 (1912),
which was specifically distinguished in Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N. Y.
112, 119, 60 N. E. 2d 829, 831 (1945).
50 N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 51 apparently authorizes this type of class
voting. The statute has not yet been tested in a court action.
51 Cf. McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N. Y. 323, 189 N. E. 234 (1934).

Ct. 1919), upholds such an agreement.
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each other directors. 52 It is not against public policy or unlawful
per se for stockholders to agree or combine for the election of direc53
tors or other officers, so as to retain control of the corporation.
Such agreement is not unlawful since, under it, the directors are still
elected by a plurality of votes as the statute mandates. 54 A voting
agreement to elect the three parties holding all the stock as directors
and officers, as long as they hold their stock, is valid.55 A breach
might be enjoined before the voting. But under Section 47 of the
Stock Corporation Law, a shareholder's vote may not be challenged
except on the basis of his not being a stockholder of record or a duly
authorized proxy of such. 56 Protection is afforded by a requirement
of unanimity for election of directors which would be valid under
Section 9.
If a minority stockholder desires employment with the corporation, which is usually the dominant objective in a close corporation,
in most cases an ordinary employment contract, in the form of an
agreement between all stockholders, suffices provided that the employee is subject to the control of the board of directors.57 An
agreement among all stockholders to elect particular officers is not
objectionable. 8 These methods are to be preferred over a provision,
pursuant to Section 9, requiring unanimity of directors' consent to
remove any officer or employee.
The foregoing examples are illustrative of the predominant
objective of members of close corporations. They indicate that the
majority of the objectives are attainable outside of Section 9. From
this fact coupled with the ten-year limitation and the technical requirements of Section 9, the conclusion is inescapable that lawyers
will tend to avoid that section. The direct method is to be desired
over any indirect method.
52 Fells v. Katz, 256 N. Y. 67, 175 N. E. 516 (1931). See Benintendi v.
Kenton Hotel, 294 N. Y. 112, 117, 60 N. E. 2d 829, 830 (1945).
53 Havemeyer v. Havemeyer, 43 N. Y. Super. Ct. 506 (1878).
5
4See Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, supra note 52.
55
Harris v. Magrill, 131 Misc. 380, 226 N. Y. Supp. 621 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
56 An application under N. Y. GuN. CORP. LAW § 25 to set aside an election
in breach of shareholders contract would be denied. The appropriate remedy
is a plenary action for specific performance. In. re Roosevelt Leather Hand
Bag Co., Inc., 68 N. Y. S. 2d 735 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
5 N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 60 expressly requires that officers and employees be subject to the control of directors.
58 "Although a provision in such an agreement that all the stockholders
will continue to vote for themselves as directors is legal, a provision for the
continuance of specified persons as officers and employees is valid only if such
persons remain faithful and efficient. . . ." In re Roosevelt Leather Hand
Bag Co., Inc., 68 N. Y. S. 2d 735, 736 (Sup. Ct. 1947). ". . . where the directors are the sole stockholders, there is no objection on ground of public
policy to enforcing an agreement among them to vote for certain persons as
officers .

.

. Such agreement, however, must be construed as one to retain

the named persons as officers only so long as they remain faithful and efficient."
Matter of Block, 186 Misc. 945, 949, 60"N. Y. S. 2d 639, 642 (Surr. Ct. 1946).

